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Abstract: The proliferation of Global Performance Indicators (GPIs), especially those that rate 
and rank states against one another, shapes decisions of states, investors, bureaucrats, and voters. 
This power has not been lost on the World Bank, which has marshaled the Ease of Doing 
Business (EDB) index to amass surprising influence over global regulatory policies – a domain 
over which it has no explicit mandate and for which there is ideological contestation. This paper 
demonstrates how the World Bank’s EDB ranking system affects policy through bureaucratic, 
transnational, and domestic-political channels. We use observational and experimental data to 
show that states respond to being publicly ranked and make reforms strategically to improve 
their ranking. A survey experiment of professional investors demonstrates that the EDB ranking 
shapes investor perceptions of investment opportunities. Qualitative evidence from India’s 
interagency EDB effort show how these mechanisms shape domestic politics and policy in the 
world’s second-largest largest emerging economy. 
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graphics. In addition, we thank all the participants at the May 2016 workshop on Assessment Power in World Politics 
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The Power of Ranking: 
The Ease of Doing Business Indicator and Global Regulatory 
Behavior 
 
 
The main advantage of showing a single rank: it is easily understood by politicians, 
journalists, and development experts and therefore created pressure to reform. As in 
sports, once you start keeping score everyone wants to win.  
– World Bank Staff Report, 20051 
 Stripping the ordinal rankings and “reforming” the report’s methodology would have 
the effect of completely destroying the report’s credibility and usefulness as a policy tool. 
– Steve Hanke, Director of the CATO Institute’s Troubled Currencies Project, in 
response to a Chinese-led effort to remove the rankings2 
 
The world is increasingly governed not by force, but by information. Information moves 
markets, affects reputations, and impinges on national security. Global Performance Indicators 
(GPIs), especially regimes that rate and rank states against one another, purposively package 
information to influence the priorities of states, the perceptions of publics, and the decisions of 
economic actors.  As the introduction to this symposium suggests, GPIs constitute an 
increasingly important form of social pressure around the world; that is, they are promulgated by 
their creators to change the information environment of communities of importance to the target 
in order to change its behavior. All social pressure is exerted through information: sometimes 
                                                               
1 Simeon Djankov, Darshini Manraj, Caralee McLiesh, Rita Ramalho. 2005. “Doing Business Indicators: Why 
Aggregate and how to do it,” p. 1. (accessed through the WayBack Machine, posting at 19 February 2006. From 
2001 to 2005 the Bank did not rank. Data that would eventually form the basis of the rankings were first published 
in the fall of 2001 on the Bank’s website. From the Way Back Machine, 
http://web.archive.org/web/20020806155832/http://rru.worldbank.org/DoingBusiness/AboutDoingBusiness.aspx 
2 https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/singapore-leads-way-doing-business. Last accesses November 10, 
2018. 
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relying on evidence and rational argument, often using emotive persuasion, and occasionally by 
making implicit or explicit demands for conformity. Its purpose is to affect the views of an 
audience of importance to the target, anticipating that the target will care about and respond to 
those views.3  
That is precisely what GPIs aim to do.  Wielding comparative information using simple 
rankings is designed to alter shared information, affect third party beliefs and opinions, and 
ultimately to convince targets that their reputation or relative status is at stake, potentially with 
material and/or social consequences. Social pressure of this kind is clearly evident in the area of 
business (de)regulation. Since the mid-2000s the World Bank has used rankings as a device to 
influence the regulatory policies of countries worldwide. By creating the Doing Business Report 
and the Ease of Doing Business (EDB) Index, the Bank has decisively shaped states’ regulatory 
behavior, especially in emerging markets and developing countries. Even though the EDB is 
formally a non-coercive reporting exercise, and may not always accurately reflect appropriate 
regulation, its existence has influenced governments around the world to change their economic 
and regulatory policies to meet the Bank’s expectations. By benchmarking and especially by 
ranking, the Bank intentionally exerts competitive social pressure on states to deregulate.4 If the 
Bank simply wanted to exert traditional economic pressure, they have long had the tools at hand, 
and scarcely needed to construct and propagate such an elaborate way to change the broader 
                                                               
3 This definition is intentionally general, and it consistent with that offered by Nugent, Pam M.S., "SOCIAL 
PRESSURE," in PsychologyDictionary.org, April 13, 2013, https://psychologydictionary.org/social-pressure/ (last 
accessed November 10, 2018). Unlike much of the socialization and social pressure literature in international 
relations (relating to human rights for example), this definition does not take a position on whether social pressure is 
used for objectively good purposes. Our definition of social pressure can also be used as a synonym for peer 
pressure. 
4 http://www.doingbusiness.org/about-us. Last accessed November 10, 2018. 
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informational environment. Instead, the Bank has chosen to innovate by manipulating 
information that influences official reputations and states’ status. 
This article explores the Bank’s intentions in establishing its deregulatory ranking 
system. We build a prima facie case for the EDB’s social influence by demonstrating its salience 
in the media and on the minds of high government officials.  Plausible observational evidence 
demonstrates an average global correlation between publicizing the rankings, bureaucratic 
adaptations responding to the rankings, and an acceleration in actual policy reforms. A survey 
experiment and case study unpack causal mechanisms. By manipulating the information 
available to an elite panel of investors, we demonstrate that EDB rankings affect assessments of 
investment opportunities. A case study of India brings the strands of the argument together and 
provides evidence that politicians see the ranking as affecting domestic politics, altering investor 
sentiment, and engaging bureaucratic reputations. The case demonstrates holistically that altering 
information allows the World Bank to intensify its influence on states, whose national politicians 
and bureaucrats believe their reputations and ability to attract business are at stake. 
Consequently, they strive to move up the rankings. Overall, a broad range of evidence, each 
source and method tailored to a specific step in the argument, shows that the Bank has 
intentionally and successfully packaged information to maximize its influence on states to reform 
business regulations in emerging markets around the world.  
 
Comparative information and social pressure: a theory of the influence of the EDB 
The World Bank’s use of the EDB index is a prime example of the mechanisms discussed 
in the symposium introduction. For decades, the Bank has used the traditional tools of loans and 
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technical assistance to influence development strategies. For a number of reasons – including the 
possibility of growing skepticism of the legitimate role of international organizations in 
traditional areas of state sovereignty5 – traditional tools of economic leverage were seen as 
undesirable and/or ineffective ways to encourage business deregulation. Instead, the Bank 
intentionally chose a communication device that leverages the views of other actors to 
encourage change. Rankings served that purpose. They simplify a complex regulatory reality, 
compare all states along a set of actionable indicators, and publicize the resulting rankings to 
media hungry for simple headlines. Investors looking for rules of thumb to guide their decisions 
pay attention. Constituents use them to pass simple judgments on policies and politicians. 
Knowing this, the Bank sees an opening to leverage information through these audiences to 
achieve results. Doing so is a Bank initiated application of social pressure. In anticipation or 
response, governments alter priorities, make bureaucratic changes, and intensify their 
engagement with the Bank to improve their rankings. Figure 1 illustrates schematically how this 
process as a whole works.  
                                                               
5 Zürn 2018. 
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Figure 1: Theory of the social influence of the Ease of Doing Business 
Ranking. Note that by framing good business practices as time and cost 
reduction, and changing the information environment, in ways that attract 
attention of investors and domestic groups, the Bank applies social pressure on its 
members to reform. Adapted from Kelley and Simmons, Symposium Introduction 
(this volume). 
 
Construction of comparative judgments is crucial in this process.6 By engaging the right-
hand segments of the loop in Figure 1, rankings reverberate and magnify whatever direct 
influence the Bank may traditionally have had on states. Since the Bank publishes overall and 
sub-index rankings, it could not be easier to sort states by their total number of reforms or a 
specific reform category.7 The format is important because broad social engagement is much less 
like to be activated by raw data alone than by comparisons.8   
                                                               
6 Sinclair 2008. 
7  See http://www.doingbusiness.org/reforms/reforms-count.  
8  Hansen and Mühlen-Schulte 2012 ; Robson 1992. 
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This is precisely the mechanism theorized in the symposium introduction: When the 
Bank deploys “business climate” information in a simple comparative format such as the EDB 
Index, they effectively change the information environment for economic and political groups 
important to the target state. Not only does the bank staff and the ministry of development (for 
example) know their rating; they both know that investors know, citizens have gotten wind, and 
other states have become aware as well. This is the essence of social pressure: it engages the 
reputations and status concerns of relevant bureaucrats and politicians, in some cases fueled by 
national pride of domestic publics more generally.9 When King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia 
declared in 2006 that, “I want Saudi Arabia to be among the top 10 countries in Doing Business 
in 2010. No Middle Eastern country should have a better investment climate by 2007,”10 he was 
displaying a status motivation that has no other metric than his kingdom’s relative performance 
on the Bank’s narrowly defined, but highly focal scale.  
Social pressure is not a bilateral relationship between the World Bank and a state; our 
theory stresses that the former alters the informational environment which in turn stimulates 
(often implicit) group pressures on states to reform. Were it not for the anticipated public 
response, the Bank would not be able to exert social pressure of the kind described here (though 
any economic leverage it may have would remain intact). Governments are likely to care about 
the beliefs of two groups in particular: domestic constituents (voters, business groups)11 and 
international investors. For domestic businesses, the rankings uniquely reveal how much more 
heavy-handed their government is than its peers. World Bank rankings recalibrate expectations 
                                                               
9 Kelley 2017 ; Kelley and Simmons 2015. 
10  World Bank 2008. 
11  Dai 2007. 
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and legitimate demands for a reduction in red tape associated with conducting business. 
International investors may be influenced by a state’s EDB rankings as well.12 Even more 
importantly, state regulators believe that the rankings influence private investment decisions, and 
will try proactively to improve their rankings to attract investment.13 Market actors14 use the 
Bank’s rankings as a credible short-hand for a competently regulated economy; perhaps for this 
reason, EDB rankings do correlate with investment flows, consistent with a claim that good 
ratings attract business.15 Unfortunately, existing studies do not distinguish between the 
underlying “business environment” the EDB is meant to reflect and the signal sent by the ratings 
per se. Methods isolating the influence on investor opinions and beliefs of information packaged 
as ratings are essential to our argument.  
But why should bureaucrats – some of whom may collect rents from existing inefficient 
red tape – care about such information? EDB rankings also reflect on the personal competence of 
an individual government minister or that of a department or bureaucracy.16 Some EDB sub-
indicators are specific enough to implicate the professionalism of business regulators, 
encouraging policy reform before the next “grading period” in order to avoid opprobrium. 
                                                               
12 This claim is tested in the investor survey experiment below. 
13 Jayasuriya 2011. Media analysis presented below speaks directly to this claim. Some scholars argue that states use 
the EDB rankings specifically as a form of “competitive signaling,” to investors and other stakeholders. Appel and 
Orenstein 2018. 
14 We cast this argument in terms of investors and markets, but for some countries, EDB indicators are more 
important to access non-market development aid: EDB sub-indicators are used in awarding Millennium Challenge 
Corporation (MCC) funding. See https://www.mcc.gov/resources/doc-pdf/report-guide-to-the-indicators-and-the-
selection-process-fy-2015. Last accessed November 10, 2018. See also https://www.mcc.gov/who-we-
fund/indicator/business-start-up-indicator. Last accessed November 10, 2018. The MCC entered into operation in 
2004, before the Bank started ranking. See US announcement when the MCA was first created here: 
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/developingnations/millennium.html. Last accessed November 
10, 2018. 
15  Corcoran and Gillanders 2015 ; Klapper, Amit, and Guillén 2010. 
16  Kelley 2017.  
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Ongoing EDB monitoring and publicity prompts bureaucracies to develop institutionalized 
routines and capacities, especially in middle tier emerging markets where incentives to develop a 
reputation for a business-friendly environment are strongest.17  
Finally, governments can use the EDB rankings strategically to gain support for their 
policies. GPIs can help leaders overcome rent-seeking politicians or competition-fearing 
monopolies by empowering allies, shaming bureaucrats, mobilizing publics, and promising to 
attract investment.18 External validation (or criticism) from a credible institution can be part of a 
strategy to bolster a broad domestic coalition for reform.19 External pressure in the form of 
rankings is sometimes a politically useful tool to accomplish leaders’ objectives in the face of 
domestic resistance. This possibility is evident in India, where Modi has emulated the World 
Bank’s tactics intranationally to intensify social pressure on Indian bureaucrats around the 
country to improve their performance. 
 
EDB Background 
Economic Theories and Bank Motives 
Over the course of the 1990s, a remarkable development was afoot in one of the most 
important public investment bureaucracies in the world. The World Bank, whose legal mandate 
was to promote investment by guaranteeing loans and supplementing private finance, began to 
turn its attention in earnest to what it saw as one underlying reason for underinvestment in the 
                                                               
17 Evidence analyzed below on reform committees, bureaucratic statements to the press, and the robust interagency 
process and sub-national competition underway in India’s EDB reform effort all suggest that the perception of 
bureaucratic competency is often at stake. 
18  DeMarzo 1992 ; Kahler 1994. 
19  Kelley 2004. 
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first place: overly burdensome business regulations.20 In the spirit of the times, academic and 
Bank researchers began to collect information that would speak to the empirical links between 
regulatory burdens, investment, and economic outcomes such as growth and development.21 
They developed the concepts and methods underlying the indices on which the rankings were to 
eventually be based in a widely-cited set of academic and policy papers that reflected the 
deregulatory and pro-investor approaches that were reaching their height at the time.22 
The EDB index was “built on the premise that firms are more likely to flourish if they 
have to abide by fewer, cheaper, and simpler regulations.” It seeks to assess “the burden of 
regulation…as seen from the private firm’s point of view,” not the net social benefits of 
regulation, and not net poverty reduction.23 A ranking that rewards reduced business costs was 
justified theoretically on the grounds that overregulation stifles business activity, stunting growth 
and development. In August 2002, the Bank noted its assessments were meant to set standards 
and to be actionable: “The [EDB] database differs from existing cross-country reports […] 
which…do not identify the nature of regulatory reforms required to improve the investment 
                                                               
20 The Bank’s legal mandate is discussed in the Articles of Agreement, Article I. 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/0,,contentMDK:20049563~pagePK:51123644~pi
PK:329829~theSitePK:29708~isCURL:Y,00.html 
21 For broader trends see, OECD, “International Standard Cost Model Manual: Measuring and reducing 
administrative burdens for businesses,” at http://www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-policy/34227698.pdf. Last accessed 
November 10, 2018. For the EU, see “Pilot Study on Administrative Burdens.” http://ec.europa.eu/smart-
regulation/refit/admin_burden/docs/enterprise/files/pilot-study_en.pdf. Last accessed November 10, 2018. 
22 See the papers posted on the Doing Business website’s methodology page: 
http://www.doingbusiness.org/methodology.  Last accessed November 10, 2018. Most prominent, is Djankov et al. 
2002., which describes barriers to setting up businesses around the world and has been cited more than 3,000 times.  
23 Both preceding quotes are in Independent Evaluation Group 2008. 
 
 
11 
climate. Doing Business aims to provide a new set of objective, quantifiable measures of 
business regulations and their enforcement.”24   
The decision to rank was a deliberate part of the strategy to impact policy. EDB’s “lively 
communication style” was designed specifically to establish benchmarks and to set states in 
competition with one another in support of the World Bank’s private-led development agenda.25 
To promote its “flagship knowledge product,”26 the Bank staff carry out a massive media 
campaign every year when the ratings are released. A separate Indicator Based Reform team 
works with countries to target policies effectively.  
 
Market Share 
The EDB product line has a robust online presence, including a Wikipedia page, and 
presence on Chartsbin, Facebook, LinkedIn, several Youtube videos, and Slideshare. 
Consequently the EDB Index enjoy tremendous “market share” among the growing list of GPIs 
that deal with national business environments. To illustrate, we selected seven of the EDB’s 
closest cognate assessments, and searched a database of over 50 thousand online media sources 
(news organizations, blogs, and other media).27  The EDB brand dominates the market for easy-
to-access comparative rankings of country performance, as Table 1 clearly shows. In fact, the 
EDB had more mentions in the media between 2010 and 2017 than the other seven cognate 
                                                               
24  From the Way Back Machine archive of the Bank’s Doing Business website, 
http://web.archive.org/web/20020806155832/http://rru.worldbank.org/DoingBusiness/AboutDoingBusiness.aspx. 
Last accessed November 10, 2018. 
25 Independent Evaluation Group 2008. 
26 Independent Evaluation Group 2008. 
27 Media Cloud: http://mediacloud.org/. Accessed via the Berkman Center, Harvard University. 
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indicators combined. In 2017 the Doing Business website had nearly 5 million annual visitors, 
166 times as many as in 2003 (Figure 2).  
 
 
Cognate Economic Indicators 
Indicator Hits Market Share 
Ease of Doing Business Index 28798 65.26% 
Global Competitiveness Index 7263 16.46% 
Heritage Index of Economic Freedom 3563 8.07% 
Global Entrepreneurship Monitor 1901 4.31% 
Fraser Economic Freedom Index 1234 2.80% 
World Competitiveness Rankings 973 2.20% 
The Enabling Trade Index 272 0.62% 
Forbes Best Countries for Business 126 0.29% 
 
Table 1: Market Share of the Ease of Doing Business Index. Showing the 
number and share of hits. Results generated from Harvard Berkman Center, 
"Media Cloud Database," 2017. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Doing Business Website Visits, Annually (2003-2016). Source: World Bank, 
Unpublished Data Provided to Authors. 
 
 
13 
 
Contestation  
Despite its dominance, the EDB indicator inhabits a contested space and faces criticisms 
about its accuracy and validity. One critical study compared EDB’s de jure measures of 
regulations with de facto measures from World Bank firm surveys and found significant 
differences between the two.28 Some firms in countries with low ranks in categories such as legal 
requirements for construction permits actually attained permits faster than countries with higher 
ranks, a pattern that also holds across many other EDB sub-categories. The rankings based on 
formal laws were, it was found, largely unrelated to actual business practice. The EDB Index has 
even been assailed for frequent changes in methodology that “had the appearance of being 
politically motivated.”29 Whether this is true or not, it illustrates disagreement over what the 
rankings actually capture. 
The ranking criteria face some sharp ideological criticism for their deregulatory biases. 
The EDB has been criticized by unions and the International Labor Organization (ILO) for 
neglecting the consequences of business deregulation for workers, and the Bank eventually 
removed labor-related components from the Index.30 EDB has likewise been criticized on 
environmental grounds for downplaying the importance of environmental assessments in favor 
                                                               
28  Hallward-Driemeier and Pritchett 2011. Available at: 
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/3330?locale-attribute=en 
29 Josh Zumbrun and Iain Talley, "World Bank Unfairly Influenced Its Own Competitiveness Rankings," The Wall 
Street Journal, January 12, 2018; "Paul Romer Quits After an Embarrassing Row," The Economist, January 25, 
2018, https://www.economist.com/news/business-and-finance/21735716-world-banks-chief-economist-questioned-
integrity-banks-research-his. Last accessed November 10, 2018. 
30 See the critique of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), at http://library.fes.de/pdf-
files/gurn/00171.pdf. Last accessed November 10, 2018. 
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of a streamlined permits process that could increase the risk of natural disasters.31 Many have 
questioned whether restrictions on female participation in business should be included in the 
ranking. When the Bank’s data on Women and the Law were included in the rankings, states like 
Saudi Arabia tumbled downward. These examples suggest that states have reasons to wonder 
whether competing to ascend the rankings could create new problems or exacerbate existing 
ones. Unsurprisingly, competitors have developed and deployed alternative measures for states’ 
business environments (Table 1). The EDB faces competition from GPIs that prioritize low taxes 
and limited government (Heritage and Frasier), that include the informal sector (Global 
Entrepreneurship Monitor), and that include labor (Global Competitiveness Index).  
 
Simplicity, Salience and Competition: Prima Facie Evidence of the Theory in Practice 
 
And yet, despite questions about its singular deregulatory emphasis and validity, the EDB 
rankings have become quite salient. Within the first year of publicizing the rankings, leaders 
from many countries, including Algeria, Burkina Faso, Malawi, Mali, and São Tomé and 
Príncipe had reportedly requested not general regulatory advice, but specific advice on how to 
improve their standings. These requests provoked the first epigraph above, marveling at the 
competitive state response, in 2005.32 The Bank itself has succinctly summarized our theory of 
                                                               
31 See for example in the case of India: http://www.dnaindia.com/analysis/column-is-ease-of-doing-business-
undermining-green-norms-2559752 
32 Simeon Djankov, Darshini Manraj, Caralee McLiesh, Rita Ramalho. 2005. “Doing Business Indicators: Why 
Aggregate and how to do it,” p. 1. (accessed through the WayBack Machine, posting at 19 February 2006. From 
2001 to 2005 the Bank did not rank. Data that would eventually form the basis of the rankings were first published 
in the fall of 2001 on the Bank’s website. From the Way Back Machine, 
http://web.archive.org/web/20020806155832/http://rru.worldbank.org/DoingBusiness/AboutDoingBusiness.aspx . 
Last accessed November 10, 2018. 
 
 
15 
social pressure: decision-makers view the EDB index as a system that compares performance, 
engages reputations, and incites competition. The Bank explicitly and intentionally designed an 
assessment system calculated to draw attention to a few very simple criteria that are plausibly but 
not unequivocally associated with a “better” business environment. The index became focal in 
part because it was one of the first to successfully harness broader intellectual and ideological 
trends, to link development with a country’s business-friendly environment, and thus to ride the 
crest of the deregulatory wave of the Washington Consensus touted by prominent economists. It 
has also been advocated by arguably the most central development institution in the world, 
leveraging the World Bank’s credibility.  
The EDB also benefits from its quantitative clarity. The ranking simply rewards any 
policy that reduces the time or the cost of doing business.33 The Bank chose not to cloud this 
focal concept with alternative or countervailing values such as fair business, socially responsible 
business, labor protection, or environmental considerations.34 The Bank further reinforces EDB’s 
legitimacy by referring to the rankings themselves as “data” on par with the rest of the World 
Development Indicators.35 As a result, the EDB has survived political pushback from powerful 
states such as China and Russia, and has become focal enough to influence significantly the 
behavior of states.  
Evidence of our theory in practice can be found in policymakers’ own words.  Over the 
past decade, policy makers around the world have spoken and acted as though the EDB matters 
                                                               
33 E.g., days to enforce a contract, and cost of contract enforcement as a share of the total claim. There are just a few 
exceptions, such as the “quality of judicial processes index” which is a sub-indicator under “enforcing contracts.”  
See http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploretopics/enforcing-contracts#close. Last accessed November 10, 2018. 
34 The Bank does maintain a database on labor protections, but does not rank states in this area and does not 
combine labor and business regulations for a composite score. 
35  See http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IC.BUS.EASE.XQ. Last accessed November 10, 2018. 
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greatly. Countries openly publicize their plans to undertake reforms. Georgia – whom some have 
criticized for gaming the system – announced concerted efforts to rise from 100th to the top 20 in 
two years.36 National officials in Yemen,37 Portugal,38 Mauritius,39 El Salvador,40 and India41 
have also highlighted EDB as motivating reforms. 
To test the general plausibility of this claim, we examined a near-comprehensive set of 
press statements and stories for 2016 in English from the Lexis Nexis database. While hundreds 
of stories mention the EDB Index, our specific interest was in the 51 English language stories 
covering 26 countries that directly cite high-ranking government officials. Illustrating the 
seriousness with which countries take the EDB Index, 14 percent of the officials cited are heads 
of state, and another 47 percent are either ministers or deputy ministers, making up over 60% of 
the stories. The remaining stories quoted spokespersons for these offices.  
These statements demonstrate the theorized channels of influence. When countries 
improve, officials highlight this accomplishment: 18 percent brag about progress on the index. 
Comparisons are rife: 14 percent of officials compare their countries to others. For example, the 
undersecretary to Cyprus’s president, who heads the president’s administrative reform unit, 
noted that Cyprus ranked 25th of 28 EU states and that “our performance there is not good.” 
Fifteen percent of the stories mention specific bureaucracies tasked with improving the EDB 
score, potentially amplifying reputational concerns. Most of the stories identify specific policy 
measures taken and link those to the EDB Index. Indonesia’s Agrarian and Spatial Planning 
                                                               
36 Schueth 2011. 
37 The World Bank Group 2009. 
38 The World Bank Group 2008. 
39 The World Bank Group 2009. 
40 The World Bank Group 2007. 
41 Discussed in detail below, relying only on non-Bank sources.  
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Minister noted specifically that a “ministerial regulation was made to respond to a survey by the 
World Bank on the ease of doing business.”42  
Many officials stressed the desire to improve their rankings. For half the countries, 
official statements – usually by a head of state – publicly commit to a specific target ranking. For 
example, Indonesian President Jokowi announced “a policy intended to improve Indonesia’s 
position in the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business rankings from 109 to 40.” In Bangladesh, a 
high-level official noted that it was, “the prime minister’s demand to see Bangladesh among the 
countries with a double-digit position (10-99) in the ‘ease of doing business index.’ It’s an 
aggressive target, but achievable.” In Kazakhstan, Erbolat Dossaev, Minister of National 
Economy committed to reach the top 30, “an objective set by the President of Kazakhstan, 
Nursultan Nazarbayev.” None less than President Vladimir Putin of Russia has gotten in the 
game. A story reports that “Russia's high positions in the Doing Business ranking were one of 
the objectives provided in the President's May decrees of 2012. Russia is to go up from the 120th 
position in 2011 to the 50th in 2015 and to the 20th in 2018.” 
This evidence shows that high-level government officials make explicit comparative 
judgments and set goals based on the EDB Index. Some also believe their efforts will be 
rewarded in a very tangible way – by attracting investment. Serbia’s Prime Minister, Aleksandar 
Vucic, acknowledged this explicitly, stating that, “Serbia wants to enter the top 30 countries on 
the World Bank’s list. This is very important for the citizens of Serbia, because the better 
positioned we are, the more we will be able to attract foreign and domestic investors.” There is 
                                                               
42 A complete file of all the quotes and sources is available online [link removed during review to preserve 
anonymity]. 
 
 
18 
ample prima facie evidence that the EDB Index has motivated a wide range of states, especially 
those with emerging markets, to take policy reforms tallied by the EDB Index. 
 
Observational Evidence: Bureaucratic Restructuring and Policy Reforms 
Words are one thing; actions are another. This section documents bureaucratic 
restructuring designed to implement specific policies to ascend the EDB rankings. The EDB 
system has a clear bureaucratic imprint in many states, and new dedicated structures help states 
ascend the rankings more efficiently. Evidence also suggests the Bank’s strategy of public 
competition has paid reform dividends: states have responded by reducing costs and time 
associated with starting a business once the rankings were made public.  
Bureaucratic efforts 
Has the EDB Index actually spurred policy reforms? Since 2006 when the bank started 
tracking, countries have undertaken 3057 sets of reforms related to the EDB.43 Many of these 
reforms appear to be concerted efforts to improve the rankings, as countries initiate 
collaborations with Bank staff in response to the rankings. For example, in 2006, Azerbaijan’s 
president declared the country’s ranking “unacceptable,” and sent a working group to consult 
with the Bank to design reforms that moved Azerbaijan up in the rankings.44 In February 2008 
the Albanian government asked the World Bank’s Doing Business Reform Unit to review 
                                                               
43 See The World Bank, http://www.doingbusiness.org/reforms/reforms-count. In reality, even more reforms 
occurred, because if a country undertook multiple reforms within a given indicator in a given year, this is counted as 
just one reform. 
44 World Bank 2008. 
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proposed legislation to protect investors and then, one month later, unanimously enacted it.45 
Such consultations are frequent. Between November 2013 and October 2014 alone, the EDB 
team received over 160 queries from countries, which suggests that bureaucracies are now 
configured to respond to the Bank’s policy advice.46 More than 50 states have formed or 
designated “reform committees” that, according to the Bank, “use the Doing Business indicators 
as one input to inform their programs for improving the business environment.”47 
 
Region Countries 
East and South Asia Indonesia, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, the 
Philippines and Sri Lanka. 
Middle East and North Africa Algeria, Kuwait, Morocco, Saudi Arabia and the 
United Arab Emirates 
Europe and Central Asia Azerbaijan, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Georgia, 
Kazakhstan, Kosovo, the Kyrgyz Republic, the 
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Moldova, 
Montenegro, Poland, the Russian Federation, 
Tajikistan, Ukraine, the United Kingdom and 
Uzbekistan 
Sub-Saharan Africa Botswana, Burundi, the Central African Republic, the 
Comoros, the Democratic Republic of Congo, the 
Republic of Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea, Kenya, 
Liberia, Malawi, Mali, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sierra 
Leone, Togo and Zambia 
Latin America Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican 
Republic, Guatemala, Mexico, Panama and Peru 
Table 2: Countries with Reform Committees Directly Using the EDB Data. Note that no 
information is available for precise date when committees were formed. These are all reform 
committees in existence as of 2015. Source: World Bank. 
 
Table 2 lists the reform committees in place as of 2015. Although countries with reform 
committees resemble those without in terms of relevant factors such as GDP growth, World 
                                                               
45 “On Entrepreneurs and Companies” (Celebrating Reforms 2009, 55-56).” 
46 World Bank 2014. 
47 The Appendix lists the countries by region. 
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Bank loans, regime type, GDP per capita or even initial EDB ranking,48 they do differ with 
respect to their EDB performance over time. Between 2007 and 2014, they undertook many 
more reforms (a total of 2.7 reforms per year compared to 1.2 reforms for those without 
committees, a statistically significant difference) and whereas the countries without committees 
dropped 13 spaces in the rankings during this period, the ones with committees rose by 11.49  
Interestingly, the rankings boost is not merely proportional to the number of reforms for 
countries with such committees; they systematically get a bigger “ranking bang” for their 
“reform buck.” We coded the annual number of reforms by each sub-indicator of the Doing 
Business Index,50 using a more fined-grained count than the Bank’s own data and coding for 
whether the reforms were positive or negative, based on Bank descriptions.51 A new variable, 
Total Reforms accounts for both positive and negative reforms. This variable has a mean of 1.6 
(and a standard deviation of 2.4), suggesting that on average countries undertook a net of 1.6 
reforms a year. The range is from -6 to 17 (some reforms are negative). It turns out that per 
reform, the countries with designated committees moved up more in the rankings (about 1.03 
places) than those without such committees (up about .55 places). In other words, countries with 
committees got nearly double the rankings reward for each reform effort. In Table 3, this Total 
Reforms variable is used to predict overall EDB ranking in the subsequent year, using a normal 
linear regression model and controlling for past ranking as well as year-fixed effects to account 
                                                               
48 See Appendix Table A1. 
49 See Table A3 in the Appendix. Using normalized rankings instead results in a drop of 5 and increase of 10 
instead, but the general picture is the same. 
50 The indicators and methodology is explained at length online. See 
http://www.doingbusiness.org/Methodology/Starting-a-Business . Last accessed November 10, 2018. 
51 Discussion of this coding is in the Appendix. 
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for any minor methodological changes over time. Models 1 and 2 demonstrate the separate 
effects of Reform Committee and Total Reforms, Models 3 and 4 illustrate the Total Reforms for 
countries with and without reform committees as separate subgroups, and Model 5 uses an 
interaction term between Reform Committee and Total Reforms to demonstrate that the 
relationship between Total Reforms and the EDB ranking differs by whether countries have 
reform committees. The analysis suggests that focused bureaucratic organization produces more 
strategic responses to the rankings, and not just to global market pressures unrelated to the EDB. 
As leaders’ own commentary in the media suggests, many states undertake specific reforms 
strategically to improve their rankings.52 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Countries included 
in model 
All 
countries 
All 
countries 
No 
Bureaus 
Bureaus 
only 
All 
countries 
      
Published Rank, lag 0.991*** 0.988*** 0.993*** 0.979*** 0.989*** 
 -0.00393 -0.00376 -0.00377 -0.00917 -0.00389 
Reform Committee -2.924***    -0.988 
 -0.694    -0.808 
Total Reforms, lag  -0.816*** -0.552*** -1.029*** 
-
0.549*** 
  -0.0933 -0.119 -0.139 -0.121 
Total Reforms * 
Reform Bureau, lag     -0.406** 
     -0.172 
                                                               
52 While it is hard to know whether such reforms are more or less appropriate than those made without the Bank’s 
close guidance and without rankings in mind, an analogy to the phenomenon of teaching (and learning) to the test is 
potentially helpful. The literature is voluminous, especially in the wake of No Child Left Behind policies of the 
2000s. See for example Jensen et al. 2014 ; Menken 2006.  Much of this literature suggests that over-reliance on 
standardized tests shifts resources and is associated with more superficial learning. While we are agnostic about the 
quality of EDB-inspired reforms, we use this analogy to understand the motivation for taking them in the first place. 
While we have documented the controversy over the validity of the EDB criteria, assessment of reform quality is 
beyond the scope of this article.  
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Constant 3.965*** 4.634*** 4.552*** 4.253** 4.677*** 
 -0.819 -0.842 -0.849 -1.987 -0.85 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,234 1,234 882 352 1,234 
Number of countries 188 188 137 51 188 
 
Table 3: The Efficiency of Bureaucratic Reforms for Ascending the Rankings. Dependent variable: 
EDB Ranking. Note that the coefficients that improve rankings are negative as countries move towards 
being number 1. 
 
 
Empirical Context: The Impact of Publicity 
The theory advanced in this symposium claims that ranking publicity per se should 
matter for reform. This is challenging to assess since the World Bank’s monitoring, reporting and 
public ranking has been introduced gradually. In the late 1990s several indices around 
competitiveness were emerging; the Bank was not the first to capture the field. The idea for the 
EDB report arose with a paper by Djankov et al. on “The Regulation of Entry,” which has been 
cited over 3,000 times and was well known before it appeared in print in 2002.53 The paper 
included a ranking of regulation on entry procedures derived from 1999 data on 85 countries 
representing a wide array of regimes types and other characteristics. In 2002, the Bank issued the 
first data on its website (roughly covering 2001), thus commencing the formal period of 
monitoring and rating. The early data covered 110 countries, but selection into that sample is not 
significantly correlated with the outcome variable measuring the regulations.54  In 2004, a report 
                                                               
53 http://www.doingbusiness.org/methodology   
54 GPD per capita income, GPD growth, democracy, population size, and international or civil conflict rarely 
correlate significantly with reform and tend not to predict selection into the sample in 2001. Not even the total 
volume of loans to a country predicts either selection into the original group of rated states or improved business 
reform measures. See Table A1 in the appendix.  
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covering 145 countries was issued for the first time, attracting more attention to the ratings and 
monitoring, but still without rankings. In 2005, the report included top twenty and also worst 
performer lists, essentially constituting a proto-ranking. By 2006 (covering 2005 data), a true 
ranking of all countries debuted. The introduction of the ranking was by no means a clean break, 
which makes it difficult to detect a precise ranking publicity effect.  
Despite the gradual introduction of ratings and rankings, we hypothesize that the full 
publication of rankings in 2006 should be associated with greater efforts to reform and therefore 
greater reductions in the relevant measures after 2006. The dependent variables are four 
indicators that were first published for “Starting a Business,” the most often referenced 
component of the index. Larger numbers represent higher costs or longer waits, and so are 
considered worse from a business perspective. Data were recovered from the Internet archive 
“The Wayback Machine” for years prior to publication. Table 4 displays the indicators and the 
years the data collection began.55  
 
Variable 
Name Definition 
First Year Published 
Online 
Starting a Business indicators (Entry Regulations) 
Capital Paid-in minimum capital (% of income per capita) required to 
start a business 
2003 
Procedures Number of procedures required for an entrepreneur to legally 
operate a business.  
2002 
Days Number of days required to start a business. 2002 
Cost  Cost (% of income per capita) of starting a business  2002 
                                                               
55 To provide a comparable time series for research, the Bank back-calculates to adjust for changes in methodology, 
but these corrections only have been made since 2003 data (in the 2004 report). Therefore, if the data in 2001 and 
2002 were then the biggest methodology-induced drop will occur between 2002-2003, which is a year before 
rankings existed. This would bias the findings against our hypothesis, because it would make a pre-ranking year 
appear to have large improvements. 
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Table 4: Overview of De Jure Reform Measures (Dependent Variables). Source: EDB 
website. Note years published covers data from the prior year.  
 
Average values of these indicators show steady declines, meaning it is easier and cheaper 
to do business in these countries on average over time. Furthermore, many more countries have 
been progressing each year than retrogressing. In 2002, for example, only 13 percent of the 
countries required fewer than 6 procedures to start a business. By 2014, half of the countries had 
come below six procedures. By 2014, in nearly a quarter of countries one could start a business 
in about a week, something that had been possible in less than 5 percent of countries in 2002. 
Figures 3 and 4 show the number of countries over time improving and backsliding on these 
measures, keeping in mind that countries face a floor effect which at some point makes further 
reductions difficult or impossible.56 
 
                                                               
56 It is not suitable to explore similar trends for the other two variables as they are based on GDP and therefore 
display minor absolute changes even when the country took no action, simply due to the change in GDP that 
inevitably occur in any given year. 
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Figure 3: Days to start a business. The number of states improving (blue) versus those 
getting worse (red). Source: authors’ counting and coding of EDB reforms (detailed in 
data appendix).  
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Figure 4: Procedures to start a business. The number of states improving (blue) 
versus those getting worse (red). Source: authors’ counting and coding of EDB 
reforms (detailed in data appendix). 
 
 
 
To examine the association between ratings and the introduction of rankings we use a 
time series simple regression model that includes controls for the most salient economic 
indicators: Polity (as a measure of regime type), GDP, population, GDP growth, loans from the 
World Bank, as well as a lag of the outcome variable for each of the four sets of models 
associated with the four sub-indicators in Table 4. The economic and outcome variables are all 
logged.  
The underlying hypothesis is whether 2006 represents a breakpoint in a trend. This is a 
hard test because of the gradual introduction in the monitoring, rating and ranking scheme and 
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run for each outcome. The first includes Ranked, the control variables, the lagged outcome and 
country fixed effects. Ranked is expected to be negative and significant in this model. The next 
model adds a Year trend variable. A negative and significant coefficient on Ranked would 
indicate greater improvements after the introduction of the rankings.  
Table 5 displays the results. In model 6-9, which only have country fixed effects, 
Ranked is associated with reductions in time, costs and procedures associated with starting a 
business, indicating greater improvements after 2006 than before. That 2006 presents a clear 
break in a trend, is evidenced for two of the four variables, Procedures and Cost, in Models 10-
13, the set of second models that add a year trend. In all cases the coefficients are small, 
suggesting the effects are modest. It is important to interpret these findings in the context of the 
findings of the analysis as a whole. Given the unfavorable conditions for observing any clear 
break due to the gradual introduction of the monitoring and rating scheme prior to the ranking, 
these results, combined with the evidence that specific countries are highly motivated by the 
rankings, plausibly support the argument that publicizing the rankings has contributed to 
reforms, and that the efforts to improve have been more intense after the introduction of the 
rankings. 
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 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 
Outcomes: Capital Cost Procedures Days Capital Cost Procedures Days 
 
Explanatory 
variables:          
Capital 0.749***    0.735***    
 -0.0251    -0.0257    
Cost  0.710***    0.686***   
  -0.0347    -0.0389   
Procedures   0.821***    0.805***  
   -0.0189    -0.0199  
Days    0.755***    0.731*** 
    -0.0211    -0.0231 
year     -0.0420*** -0.0218*** -0.00578** -0.0196*** 
     -0.014 -0.00825 -0.00233 -0.00597 
Ranked -0.102* -0.115*** -0.0356*** -0.0851*** 0.000194 -0.0522* -0.0192* -0.0327 
 -0.0559 -0.0344 -0.00931 -0.0262 -0.0589 -0.0283 -0.0102 -0.03 
GDP -0.325* -0.462*** -0.0831*** -0.251*** 0.169 -0.248** -0.0239 -0.0536 
 -0.187 -0.0793 -0.0284 -0.0868 -0.272 -0.12 -0.045 -0.119 
GDP growth .00257 -.00590*** -.000857 -.00478*** -.000504 -.00711*** -.00117 -.00597*** 
 -.00556 -.00199 -.000746 -.00167 -.00561 -.00194 -.000761 -.00174 
Polity 0.0166 -0.0117* -0.00252 -0.00537 0.0186 -0.0111* -0.00231 -0.00447 
 -0.0181 -0.00629 -0.00196 -0.00469 -1.82E-02 -0.006 -0.00203 -0.00508 
WB Loans -0.153 -0.197*** -0.0386*** -0.0982** 0.0998 -0.0835 -0.00795 0.00603 
 -0.0965 -0.0396 -0.0144 -0.0427 -0.141 -0.0631 -0.0229 -0.0603 
         
Country fixed 
effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,551 1,651 1,651 1,651 1,551 1,651 1,651 1,651 
Countries 134 134 134 134 134 134 134 134 
 
Table 5: The Effect of Ranking on reductions in time, cost and procedures for starting a business. Note: all reform variables and 
economic variables are logged. All explanatory variables except year are lagged one year. 
 
 
29 
EDB Channels of Influence: Altering Information for Investors  
Correlations linking ranking publicity to bureaucratic and policy reforms are one thing; 
causation involving specific mechanisms is another. We have argued that the Bank promulgates 
ranking information to pressure states to conform to its favored policies. We have shown that 
governments pay attention to these rankings, that they have altered their bureaucracies 
strategically to enhance their performance rankings, and that media coverage suggests that 
competitive signaling to domestic constituencies and investors is one important reason. But does 
the information contained in the ratings themselves plausibly change important groups’ 
perceptions enough to encourage reform?   
Governments have told us – repeatedly and in public – that ascending the EDB rankings 
will improve their countries’ ability to attract business investment. It is therefore tempting simply 
to run a regression to see whether improvements in the ratings do attract more capital, but this 
would not help to understand the effect of rankings per se because it is nearly impossible with 
observational data to separate the ranking effects from the underlying qualities rankings purport 
to measure. In fact, economists have run such tests, and have shown that the EDB rankings are, 
as expected, highly predictive of inward FDI when included in standard models of foreign 
investment flows. These studies conflate the ranking information with the underlying business 
environment, and assume they are the same thing. Corcoran and Gillanders for example assert 
that the EDB rankings are “a very objective measure of regulation,”57 and their study cannot – 
and was not designed to – separate ranking pressure from underlying characteristics of the 
                                                               
57 Corcoran and Gillanders 2015.:105. 
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regulatory environment. The ease of starting a business component of the rankings has also been 
used to predict new business start-ups, which is offered as evidence of the positive effects of 
“good governance” but could just as well entail a distinct ranking effect; the point is, we cannot 
distinguish these claims with such correlations.58 Critical legal research59 as well as statistical 
studies60 have warned against the methodological, substantive and conceptual problems with 
relying on the EDB indicators for assessing the business environment. To accept any EDB-
investment correlation on face value reinforces the common but potentially fallacious 
assumption that rankings are meaningful – an assumption that fuels their impact, but which is 
precisely the relationship scrutinized here. 
A better way to explore the causal claim of the power of the ranking per se is with a 
survey experiment. The goal is to test whether the “false reductionism”61 of the EDB rankings 
impact how investors assess investment risks. No study to date – positive or critical – has shown 
that the rankings frame how investors think about risk. To do so we recruited 150 investment 
professionals, and manipulated information about EDB rankings, controlling macroeconomic 
information for a hypothetical “emerging market economy” (based on India and using Indian 
macroeconomic information) and varied the EDB rankings as treatment.62 We hypothesize that 
even when controlling for important economic and political conditions, information about EDB 
rankings will influence the willingness to recommend an investment in the ranked country. By 
changing investors’ information set, we aretesting whether the upper right loop of the argument 
                                                               
58 Klapper, Amit, and Guillén 2010. 
59 Michaels 2009. 
60 Pinheiro-Alves and Zambujal-Oliveira 2012. 
61 Michaels 2009. 794-795. 
62 These experiments were preregistered with www.egap.org.  
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in Figure 1 causally alters investors’ perceptions and therefore plausibly provokes the 
“government concern” in the lower part of the Figure. 
A perfect approximation of a real-world information environment that informs 
investment assessment is experimentally unattainable. We do not purport to estimate the EDB’s 
impact on investments in the real world, but rather, to show it is plausible that EDB rankings – 
which may or may not reflect a meaningful reality – prime investment attitudes. In reality, 
investors confront a more crowded information environment than that in the experiment. But it is 
also clear that investors depend heavily on a few crucial economic indicators as well as other 
heuristics when making decisions.63 We included critical macroeconomic information and 
alerted investors that the hypothetical country was an “emerging market economy,” capturing 
enough salient features of investor decision-making sufficient to glean some insights into EDB’s 
influence on investors’ assessments.  
The panel of 150 investors was recruited by Qualtrics through a partnership with over 20 
Golden Mean certified and actively-managed online market research panel providers.64 
Respondents were subjected to comprehension checks, asked to answer free response questions, 
highly-compensated for their time, and directly recruited by Qualtrics – which verified their 
status as industry professionals. To be clear: we do not claim to have recruited a “globally 
representative sample of investors” – which we would not begin to know how to define.  The 
sample of portfolio managers are upper middle-class investment professionals living across the 
                                                               
63 For an in-depth exploration, see Mosley 2000. Sometimes these heuristics are surprisingly unrelated to economic 
fundamentals. See for example Gray 2013. 
64 It was pre-tested on “mTurk Masters.” Treatment effects were present for both experiments, but were stronger and 
more significant for investors, who are more familiar with investment decision-making. 
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United States. All participants had over five years of experience in the investment industry. 
About half had over twenty years of experience. Roughly half held high-level positions at their 
investment firm, such as senior director, managing director, vice president, partner, principal, or 
president/CEO. Investor strategies varied, with nearly half identifying as value investors and 
others identifying as macro, stock, bond, long/short, and activist investors. The average 
respondent was fifty years old; the oldest was seventy-eight and the youngest twenty-six. 
Roughly three-quarters of respondents were male.  
Portfolio managers made up three-quarters of the respondents, while others worked in 
private equity, venture capital, bank lending, and other investment sectors. Portfolio managers 
are a hard test for EDB influence. Because they buy and sell securities of foreign firms that are 
already operating in difficult environments, they should be less sensitive to the EDB ranking 
than direct investors, for whom day-to-day business operations are a primary concern. Portfolio 
investment is of significant concern to emerging market states since its rapid outflow can 
precipitate currency and financial crises, which makes the experiment more relevant to emerging 
economies. Without claiming representativeness, this panel is one of the few in international 
relations research to recruit relevant professionals rather than draw from students or the general 
population. 
To avoid self-selection bias, recruitment did not involve any discussion of the survey 
contents. Respondents received a non-trivial incentive for their participation from Qualtrics or its 
market research partners, and the response rate was 32%. The survey asked respondents to 
consider an investment in an unnamed emerging market country. To ensure findings are not an 
artifact of hypothetical conditions, we used India’s true (announced) EDB goals and 
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macroeconomic information – the exact information with which investors and the broad public 
have been “treated” in reality. Respondents were assigned to one of three groups: a control group 
and two treatment groups. Those in the Control Group (No EDB information) were given four 
macroeconomic facts about an unnamed country which, unknown to them, was based on India: 
Real GDP Growth: 7%; Inflation Rate: 6%; Unemployment Rate: 10%; Per Capita Income: 
$6000.65 Those in Treatment Group 1 were given these same four macroeconomic facts but were 
also told that the unnamed country had an EDB rank of 30, which in fact is Indian Prime 
Minister Modi’s target rank for India. Those in Treatment Group 2 were given the same four 
macroeconomic facts, but were told that the unnamed country had an EDB rank of 130, which is 
India’s pre-reform rank. Thus, both the panel recruits and the information they were provided are 
highly realistic, imbuing the survey with as much external validity as is possible in the inherent 
confines of an experimental setting. 
Respondents were asked, all things equal and based only on the information they were 
given, how likely they would be to recommend investment in the unnamed country. Answers 
were scored on a seven-point Likert Scale with 7 serving as the highest likelihood of 
recommending investing and 1 the lowest. Higher scores and positive coefficients reflect an 
increase in likelihood of investment. In addition to OLS, three other tests were used: a boot-
strapped T-test, a non-parametric Wilcoxon Rank Sum test, and OLS including a series of 
controls such as investment industry, investment strategy, title, experience, and the respondent’s 
assumption of where the country was located. 
                                                               
65 To check whether people were guessing that this was India, we asked participants to later identify which region 
they thought the country was in and no clear pattern emerged. This variable was also used as a control. 
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The EDB ranking significantly affected investors’ expressed intent to recommend 
investment. Relative to respondents who were told the unnamed country had an EDB rank of 130 
(Treatment 2), those told it had a rank of 30 (Treatment 1) said on average that they would be far 
likelier to recommend investment (by more than one full point on a seven-point scale; or roughly 
19% more likely). This finding was significant across all four statistical tests at p<.01 (Table 6).  
 
 OLS OLS With Controls
1 Bootstrapped 
T-Test 
Wilcoxon Rank 
Sums Test 
EDB Rank of 30 
vs. EDB Rank 
of 130 
 
1.1273*** 
(.3313) 
p=.0010 
 
 
1.1090*** 
(.3763) 
p=.0044 
 
1.1230*** 
(.3372) 
 p=.0008 
 
W=789*** 
p=.0025 
Control vs. EDB 
Rank of 130 
EDB 
 
.9758*** 
(.3020) 
p=.0017 
 
 
.5920* 
(.3512) 
p=.0962 
 
.9774*** 
(.3001) 
p=.0012 
 
 
W=1873*** 
p=.0024 
EDB Rank 30 
vs. Control 
 
 
.1515 
(.3645) 
p=.6790 
 
 
.3956 
(.4046) 
p=.3320 
 
 
.1503 
(.3632) 
p=.6790 
 
W=1071 
p=.7023 
*p<.1, **p<.05, ***p<.01 
1Industry, Strategy, Title, Experience, Assumed Region 
Table 6: Experimental Results of Ranking Differences on Investment Likelihood.  Note a 
positive coefficient entails a higher Likert score and a greater willingness to invest in the first 
group relative to the second. 
 
Relative to the control group with no ranking information, those told the unnamed 
country had an EDB Rank of 130 said they would be much less likely to recommend investment 
(by .95 points on a seven-point scale, or roughly 18% less likely).66 This was significant at p<.01 
                                                               
66 We also asked respondents what their preferred return would be for this investment. Most respondents complained 
that this specific question was too difficult to answer. Consequently, answers to these questions exhibited a wide 
dispersion and no significant differences among groups 
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across all four tests and suggests politicians may be right to fear that a poor EDB ranking could 
reduce investment. Within this experiment, a higher EDB rank induced greater investment 
enthusiasm than a lower rank, and low rank significantly depressed willingness to recommend 
investment relative to no EDB ranking information at all. 
In a free-response section after the survey, many respondents who received the EDB rank 
of 30 noted its influence on their investment recommendation. One respondent wrote: “While 
real GDP growth is substantial, the high unemployment rate is of some concern…[and] already 
high inflation could get worse…Ease of doing business certainly helps however.” Another 
thought EDB helped mitigate uncertainty: “while there are risks…it is comparatively easy to do 
business.” One investor even noted that the country was a “great growth opportunity” because of 
its “low economic barriers” as indicated by the EDB ranking. Conversely, those who received 
the low ranking of 130 also suggested it guided their decisions negatively. As one respondent 
argued, “While the GDP growth and income numbers suggest potential, the unemployment rate 
and poor ease of doing business rank indicate some structural issues with the country and its 
governance” (italics added). 
Finally, those who received an EDB rank of 30 were more likely on a seven-point Likert 
scale to believe the government was more competent, less corrupt, would attract competing 
investment, and would not discriminate between foreign and domestic investors compared to 
those who received a rank of 130. While these results do not quite achieve statistical 
significance, they tell a consistent story. They also suggest that the EDB may appeal to 
governments as an “easier” way to attract capital than a far-reaching anti-corruption campaign or 
an expensive infrastructure program, as the case of India below shows.  
 
 
36 
The conclusions drawn from this experiment are significant but limited. Emphatically, it does not 
prove that high EDB rankings actually increase investment. It does show that the EDB ranking is 
an important piece of information that can frame how investors assess investment risk. The 
framing effect in this experiment illustrates precisely the hypothesized causal mechanism. One 
might be concerned that surveyed investors are just expressing their own pre-existing belief that 
rankings represent genuinely better business conditions. This may be so, but it is not inconsistent 
with the proposed mechanism that ranking information influences investor thinking.  We are 
agnostic about what the EDB “really” captures (though we have cited several skeptical studies). 
Such a belief merely suggests investors find the rankings useful, perhaps even credible. In the 
hands of the World Bank, such ratings induce pressure – based on officials’ beliefs about 
investors’ beliefs informed by the ranking – to adopt the reforms that will boost their state’s 
rankings.67  
 
Tracing Influence Channels in Modern India  
   The preceding sections have assembled evidence that the EDB has shaped state 
behavior and suggests that it can frame the attitudes of investors and other salient groups. This 
                                                               
67 In a separate experiment described in the appendix, we found similar ranking effects on the part of the Indian 
general public, illustrating the potential for a “domestic constituency effect” described in the symposium 
introduction. Members of the general public typically have almost no sense of how the business environment at 
home compares with that elsewhere. The EDB may be one of the few ways these groups can come to learn about 
whether or not it is reasonable to expect one’s own government to do a lot better than it has done to date. In this 
separate experiment conducted with Indian citizens, information about India’s EDB rank of 130 was held constant, 
but the rank of China – a status competitor for India – was manipulated. A high Chinese ranking was found to 
stimulate competitive expectations and increase the importance Indians attached to a high EDB ranking and the 
priority they placed on a better business climate. The experiment offers another plausible way the Bank leverages its 
ability to apply social pressure to conform. See the Appendix for a description of the experiment and findings.  
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case study explores these mechanisms in the case of India . It shows that the EDB indicator has 
created social pressure by encouraging political actors to believe their status is at stake and in 
competition with other countries and even other Indian states. That competition is heightened 
because of the perception that investment and political support are at stake. Indian officials seek 
to improve their EDB rankings because they believe it will win votes, secures investment, and 
improves official reputations – and they organize major inter-agency efforts to ascend the 
rankings. The case ties together much of the preceding evidence, demonstrating that changes in 
informational framing spark concerns about current and future rankings, and incentivize state 
reform behavior. 
India provides an important—though not an obvious—case to explore these channels. It 
is significant for its sheer size. If the EDB Index influences policy in the fifth largest economy in 
the world, the “average” effects described in the observational analysis are even more important. 
The research is based exclusively on independent (non-World Bank) evidence, including Indian 
Hindi and English-language media and primary sources. It demonstrate that the reformist 
government of Narendra Modi has made climbing the ranks of EDB a central feature of his 
government’s agenda. The effort has been mentioned in party platforms, is explicitly coordinated 
through inter-agency mechanisms, and is implemented in part through local governments by 
using sub-national rankings to stimulate competition, embarrass opponents, and reward 
supporters. Together, the contextualized Indian evidence strongly suggests, per the introductory 
essay, that Indian political figures and bureaucrats anticipate and react to the EDB pressures 
transmitted through political, investment, and bureaucratic channels. It also demonstrates 
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strategic behavior on the part of Modi’s government, with EDB-related reforms undertaken in 
large part for their value in lifting India’s ranking.   
 
Background 
Narendra Modi began to focus on the EDB Index late in his 2013 campaign for Prime 
Minister. Emphasizing the business-friendly roots of his political party, the Bhartiya Janata Party 
(BJP), Modi blamed India’s poor rating on the ruling Congress Party and promised to improve 
the ranking. The BJP implicitly included EDB Index improvement in the 2014 party platform 
when it promised “making 'doing business' in India easy.”68 
Not long after Modi assumed power with the largest parliamentary majority in decades 
(2014), he announced the “Make in India” program, a set of policies intended to attract 
investment and transform India into a manufacturing powerhouse. The EDB Index was central to 
this new campaign. It was linked to manufacturing and investment within the BJP policy 
platform, and in subsequent official policy. In fact, Modi first formally announced his EDB 
initiative in a major national speech launching the Make in India Campaign. The effort to 
improve India’s EDB ranking is integral to the country’s most visible domestic economic 
program and is a signature Modi initiative.  
Modi has always been clear that his EDB-related reforms were not about improving 
microeconomic incentives but about signaling a welcoming investment climate through a higher 
EDB ranking. In his speech announcing his EDB effort, Modi declared that, “Industrialists don’t 
come due to some fancy incentive scheme. One can say you will get this or that we will make 
                                                               
68 BJP Election Manifesto 2014: Ek Bharat Shreshthah Bharat: 2014. 
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this tax free or that tax free. Incentives don’t work.” 69 Instead, “the investor first wants the 
security of his investment. Growth and profit come later,” Modi argued. For that reason, India 
needed to send a signal to investors that “your money will not sink.” The EDB initiative was part 
of that signaling effort and Modi committed his entire team in Government to improve India’s 
ranking from 130 to 50, and then later to 30. While the reforms adopted may well have economic 
benefits that ordinarily could explain their adoption, these were undertaken for symbolic rather 
than economic value. The prime minister’s words and behavior reveal a belief that rankings 
matter more than economic incentives – they improve India’s reputation, and thereby attract 
investment. 
 
Coordinated Efforts to Improve India’s EDB Ranking 
Modi followed up his 2014 announcement of an EDB initiative with a wide-ranging 
interagency coordinated effort to improve the country’s ranking. India’s most powerful 
bureaucrat, the Cabinet Secretary, has called high-profile meetings of senior officials to discuss 
how to improve India’s ranking.70 These efforts are coordinated not only through the Department 
of Industrial and Policy Planning (DIPP), which has been tasked with leading Modi’s “Make in 
India” campaign and coordinating state-level reforms. Roughly a month after Modi announced 
the initiative, DIPP published a report with 46 policy proposals across several government 
ministries hewing almost precisely to the Bank’s sub-indicators and intended to improve India’s 
ranking. The Indian government has adopted many of these reforms, including reducing the 
                                                               
69 Modi 2014 
70 "DIPP Suggests Steps to Improve Business Climate" 2014. 
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number of days it takes to register a business from 27 to 1; simplifying application forms for 
industrial licenses; placing license applications online; exempting several business from 
licensing requirements; extending the validity of licenses; raising FDI caps in several industries; 
introducing a new regulatory reform law; simplifying import-export documentation; and 
abolishing the Soviet-style Planning Commission. At the sub-national level, in December 2014, 
the DIPP sponsored a meeting of central and local governments where state leaders committed to 
a 98-point action plan to improve EDB at the local level.71 DIPP also created a list of 344 
recommendations for state-level governments,72 and organized meetings through which states 
were to share their best practices.73 Regardless of whether these reforms have economic benefits, 
they are generally discussed by DIPP as ways of improving India’s ranking. 
The Modi government – convinced of the very EDB influence channels this paper 
identifies – even chose to reproduce the international EDB competition domestically among 
Indian states. In concert with the World Bank, the central government created its own state-level 
EDB indicator to score India’s states on their compliance with the 98-point action plan and 
publicly praise or criticize them for their performance. In one report, seven Indian states led by 
the BJP made the top ten, suggesting either party-line cooperation or efforts to reward political 
allies through the ranking. These rankings were then used as framing devices in domestic 
politics, instruments to attract state investment, and as proxies for bureaucratic competence. For 
example, during a visit to BJP-governed Jharkhand, Modi praised its leaders for working hard to 
                                                               
71 Nidhi 2015. 
72 Business Reform Action Plan 2016 for States/UTs  2015. 
73 Chitravanshi 2015. 
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improve their EDB ranking.74 In advance of critical elections in Bihar that would determine the 
balance of power in India’s upper house of parliament, Modi’s finance minister attacked Nitish 
Kumar, the chief minister of Bihar, for his state’s low EDB ranking in 2015: “Nitish says let us 
debate the development issue. What is there to debate? This debate is over. Gujarat [the state 
Modi previously managed] is number 1 and Bihar stands at 21 [on EDB]. The economy speaks 
through statistics and not through debate.”75   
Since Modi took office, the World Bank has supported India’s attempts to climb the EDB 
Index, and publicly praised the government for its ambition. The Bank explicitly recognizes its 
rankings shape Indian politics. It offered an explanation for why India’s ranking ascended so 
little in Modi’s first year that absolved him of responsibility; praised him regularly for his 
cooperation with the Bank; and even sent the World Bank CEO to attend Modi’s celebratory 
address on India’s thirty-place climb and first-ever entry into the top one hundred ranks.76 
Attesting to the importance of the rankings per se, Indian officials have also actively lobbied the 
World Bank’s Doing Business team to improve their scores.77 As one senior government official 
involved in those meetings noted: “We listed a host of measures we have taken to cut red tape 
and improve business environment in the country. We are confident of seeing a substantial 
improvement in our ranking this year.”78  
                                                               
74 "Through Mudra Yojana We Want to Accelerate Development Process in India: PM at Inauguration of Mega 
Credit Camp in Jharkhand." http://www.bjp.org/en/shri-narendra-modi-feed/through-mudra-yojana-we-want-to-
accelerate-development-process-in-india-pm-at-inauguration-of-mega-credit-camp-in-jharkhand. 
75 "Arun Jaitley Counters Nitish Kumar." 2015. The Times of India. 
76 “World Bank ‘Ease of Doing Business’ Report Doesn’t Factor in Modi Government’s Reforms: BJP,” The 
Economic Times, October 30, 2014, http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2014-10-
30/news/55595538_1_modi-government-doing-business-report-world-bank.  These actions attest to the willingness 
of the Bank to not only engage in social pressure through rankings, but to engage in related strategies of back-
patting for favorite pupils as well. 
77"DIPP Urges World Bank to Upgrade India’s Ease of Doing Business Ranking"  2015. 
78"DIPP Urges World Bank to Upgrade India’s Ease of Doing Business Ranking"  2015. 
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EDB Index Channels of Influence 
The India case illustrates several of the influence channels described in the symposium 
introduction. First, it demonstrates domestic political channels. Indian politicians acted as if they 
thought the Indian public may be sensitive to the status implications of the EDB Index; indeed, 
when Modi was an opposition politician, his party used the country’s low ranking to shame the 
incumbent government. Modi himself campaigned on the promise of making improvements. In 
office, he is making better rankings a priority.79 Despite criticism, he has doubled down on his 
commitment to improve India’s ranking and has, if anything, scaled up his ambitions by setting a 
new goal to rank in the top thirty. Importantly, Modi made this commitment credible by 
promising to achieve a high target rank before the next election, allowing voters to punish him 
for failure. In short, Modi has hitched his domestic political reputation to the rankings – not to a 
specific growth figure or a poverty reduction goal. His own public commitments – and the 
Banks’s efforts to avoid embarrassing him – suggest the ranking competition is a significant 
driver of Indian policy.  
Even as India’s growth slowed to a three-year low ahead of the next national elections, 
Modi leaned on India’s thirty-place climb in EDB rankings to demonstrate he had improved 
India’s status and its economy.80 He gave a major address dedicated to India’s thirty-place climb 
in the rankings and trumpeted India’s success relative to other countries: “This year, India’s 
                                                               
79 "Text of PM’s Letter to the People on Economic Issues." http://www.bjp.org/en/shri-narendra-modi-feed/text-of-
pm-s-letter-to-the-people-on-economic-issues. Last accessed November 10, 2018 
80 https://www.narendramodi.in/pm-modi-attends-programme-on-ease-of-doing-business--537653 . Last accessed 
November 10, 2018. 
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jump in ranking is the highest [of all countries]. India has been identified as one of the top 
reformers….[and] may become an example for many other nations.” To make EDB even more 
politically salient, Modi linked it to the “life of a common man” by recasting it as the “Ease of 
Living Life” indicator.  He also leveraged the rating to shame his opposition:  
“Had these kind of reforms...been carried out during [the opposition's] tenure, then our 
ranking would have improved much earlier. And the credit for improvement in ranking 
would have gone to them....they did nothing and have had been raising questions about 
someone who has been doing something. It’s just a coincidence that the World Bank 
started the process of releasing the ease of doing business ranking in 2004. It’s an 
important year. And all of you know who was in the government [the Congress Party] 
since then till 2014.”81 
 
One of India’s major newspapers, The Indian Express, wrote that India’s thirty-rank increase 
“comes as a shot in the arm for the Narendra Modi government amid dissenting voices in certain 
quarters about implementation of the Goods and Services Tax (GST) as well as demonetization,” 
two policies that had called into question Modi’s economic credentials.82 For that reason, Modi’s 
chief political opponent, Rahul Gandhi, has made attacking Modi’s EDB gains a part of his 
stump speech, stating that Modi’s team “listens to outsiders” and should instead ask the Indian 
people “whether ease of doing business has improved for them…What is spoken abroad is truth 
for this government but what the poor say in India is farce.”83 These statements together 
demonstrate that India’s leading politicians act as if EDB shapes domestic politics and recognize 
the high ranking as status-enhancing for India.   
                                                               
81 https://www.narendramodi.in/pm-modi-attends-programme-on-ease-of-doing-business--537653. Last accessed 
November 10, 2018.  
82 http://indianexpress.com/article/business/economy/world-bank-ease-of-doing-business-india-rank-100-arun-
jaitley-gst-demonetisation-narendra-modi-4916051/ Last accessed November 10, 2018. 
83 https://www.hindustantimes.com/assembly-elections/gst-and-note-ban-have-ruined-ease-of-doing-business-rahul-
gandhi-takes-on-govt-day-after-world-bank-report/story-68LlcqSuLmiyTDvfrS7qcP.html.  Last accessed November 
10, 2018 
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Second, the case demonstrates that political figures in emerging markets act as if they 
believe the rankings will affect investment levels, which complements the experimental evidence 
above. Modi repeatedly states the belief that EDB affects investment levels. A review of all 
Modi’s foreign addresses establishes that he has broadcast his ambitions on the EDB on virtually 
every foreign trip for three straight years, including addresses before Davos and the G20 as well 
as to audiences in capital-rich countries like the United States, China, France, Germany, Japan, 
Saudi Arabia, South Korea, and the United Kingdom, among others.84 Modi even created a joint 
“Ease of Doing Business Group” with the United States during the first U.S.-India Strategic and 
Commercial Dialogue – another signal to the global community that India is a secure and easy 
place to do business – and has repeatedly declared his belief that EDB efforts have helped attract 
record investment.85  
Third, the case demonstrates the importance of bureaucratic channels. Modi embedded 
the EDB effort in the national bureaucracy, created interagency structures to improve the ranking 
and tied its success or failure at the national level to specific officials. At the state level, he 
launched a sub-national ranking mechanism and used state EDB rankings to praise reformers and 
shame laggards, triggering reputational mechanisms among local Indian politicians and 
bureaucrats. He has publicly acknowledged these mechanisms and declared that under his sub-
                                                               
84 Narendra Modi 2015. "Text of PM’s Statement at India-Republic of Korea CEOs Forum." "Full Text of Prime 
Minister Narendra Modi’s Speech at the India-China Business Forum in Shanghai" 
http://indianexpress.com/article/india/narendra-modi-shinzo-abe-india-japan-business-leaders-forum-full-text-
4843829/ Last accessed November 10, 2018 
85 https://www.narendramodi.in/pm-modi-attends-programme-on-ease-of-doing-business--537653 Last accessed 
November 10, 2018 
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national ranking system states are “often competing with each other in implementing business 
reforms,” which will help the country’s overall ranking.86 
The channels discussed in the symposium introduction are on full display in India. Modi 
would have been a reformer regardless, but he latched onto the EDB Index as a tool because he 
believes that domestic political actors, foreign investment communities, and professional 
bureaucrats care about the index too. In so doing, the index became influential in giving content 
to his reform ambitions. He even encouraged his subordinates to pursue EDB-tailored reforms. 
Thus, the EDB Report and rankings are clearly shaping the policy response in one of the world’s 
largest and fastest growing economies. 
Conclusion 
GPI creators aim not only to call attention to their issue and set standards of appropriate 
behavior; most hope to change policy outputs and—ultimately—outcomes. By relying on 
multiple forms of data, we have presented considerable evidence that the World Bank’s EDB 
Index motivates reforms, perhaps even above and beyond those one might expect from 
consulting with or borrowing from the World Bank alone. One interviewee in the investment 
consulting industry exclaimed unprompted that the EDB Index was one of the most effective 
things the World Bank had ever done.87  
The news is good for those who support the contents of the EDB Index and want to use it 
as a model in other areas.88 For those who believe the EDB Index is flawed, its influence is cause 
                                                               
86 https://www.narendramodi.in/pm-modi-attends-programme-on-ease-of-doing-business--537653. Last accessed 
November 10, 2018 
87 Anonymous interview with authors, August 2014. 
88 Independent Evaluation Group 2008. 
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for concern. Despite episodes of pressure to withdraw the rankings or alter the criteria by 
countries such as China or organizations such as the ILO, the Bank has continued to rank states 
because it believes the Index is indeed an effective tool.89 Interestingly, both critics of the EDB 
Index and the Bank’s refusal to drop it assume EDB rankings have an effect – for good or for ill 
– on reform policy. Ours is the first study to systematically document the major influence 
channels that connect an annually-published rank-ordered list of countries with powerful policy 
trends and consequential shifts in state behavior. 
The most important message of this research is what it says about new ways to capture 
governance spaces and exert social pressure by using ingenious forms of communication. GPIs 
are communication strategies to draw attention to issues, and to define problems and offer 
solutions using extreme forms of simplification. As such, they are an international counterpart to 
“nudge” tactics much touted by behavioral economists and psychologists as ways to shift human 
behavior in desired ways.90 Actors that try to create competitive dynamics and other forms of 
social pressure through ranking systems know that they oversimplify reality, strip concepts of 
their context and history, and offer a false sense of precision and certainty.91 But the point of 
ranking systems is to change behavior, not to faithfully render reality. The ILO has understood 
this point very well and has been a strong proponent of keeping the labor flexibility measures out 
of the Bank’s overall EDB Index, while countries like Saudi Arabia have balked at the recent 
addition of gender components. 
                                                               
89 In 2013 a formal review (Independent Doing Business Report Review Panel, 24 June 2013, Washington D.C.) 
commenced following pressure from China which was unhappy with its rankings, discussed tensions over the 
rankings and once again recommended that they be removed. The Bank ignored the recommendation. 
https://www.economist.com/leaders/2013/05/25/stand-up-for-doing-business. Last accessed November 10. 2018. 
90 Sunstein et al. 2010. 
91 Merry 2011. 
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This deep-dive into the World Bank indicator has important high-altitude implications for 
global information politics and governance. It reminds us that information is not neutral, but 
rather is an important power resource. The World Bank has used the EDB Index to consolidate 
its authority to address not just development lending, but business regulation as well. Arguably, 
the case of the World Bank’s EBD Index suggests that cumulative effect of widespread 
comparative quantification is to reinforce global power structures.92 That said, there is some 
evidence that alternative power centers – notably China – understands the game and will soon 
launch a few new rankings of its own, and its Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank may 
eventually be as much an opportunity to offer alternative scorecards for states as it will be a 
resource for finance.  
This study helps explain the influence of rankings in international relations.  Combined, 
the evidence goes beyond the standard scrutiny of the validity of the EDB data to show that 
rankings per se stimulate competitive dynamics with policy consequences. These findings invite 
examination of related questions. For example, is it wise to pursue complex policies of 
deregulation by deploying simple heuristics, such as ranking systems?  Do states regularly game 
such systems to improve their scores rather than select the most appropriate policies?93 Who 
gains “authority” to rank, and why? Is it fair that a few actors world-wide can use first mover 
advantage and other strategic positions to set standards over which states are then pressured to 
compete? How should the use of GPIs as tools of governance themselves be governed – purely 
                                                               
92 Löwenheim 2008. 
93 While countries often start with easier, more actionable, reforms, we explored gaming in several ways, but found 
no systematic evidence for it. 
 
 
48 
by the market place of ideas? These and other questions need answers if we are to understand the 
full range of normative issues associated with the power of assessments in global governance.  
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